Trump Sets April 6 Power Grid Deadline, Posts Bridge Destruction Video; War Powers 60-Day Clock Expires April 28-29

MIDDLE EAST — Two deadlines now bracket the next phase of Operation Epic Fury. President Trump’s self-imposed April 6 pause on Iranian power grid strikes expires in three days.

The 60-day War Powers Resolution statutory clock, with no congressional authorization granted, expires around April 28–29, 2026.

On April 2, President Trump stated via Truth Social that Iran’s new leadership had requested a ceasefire. He conditioned any consideration on the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, adding that until then strikes would continue.

Between those dates the administration has signaled that the campaign will intensify: Trump told the nation on April 1 that strikes will continue “extremely hard over the next two to three weeks” and that every Iranian electric generating plant will be hit “probably simultaneously” if no deal is reached.

The military picture through week five shows continued degradation of Iranian capabilities. CENTCOM reported that U.S. forces have struck more than 12,300 targets inside Iran as of early April 2026.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Dan Caine reported on March 31 that Iran has suffered significant naval losses with more than 150 vessels damaged or destroyed, that Iranian missile and drone launches have fallen to the lowest level since operations began, and that Iran’s defense industrial base is “nearly completely destroyed.”

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters on March 31 that objectives are achievable in “weeks, not months.” Negotiations through presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary Rubio are what Hegseth assessed as “very real” and “gaining strength.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry responded on April 2 that Trump’s ceasefire characterization is “false and baseless,” with Foreign Minister Araghchi stating via IRNA that Iranian forces are “prepared with their fingers on the trigger” and that “the trust level is at zero.”

Campaign Scope: More Than 12,300 Sites Struck Through Week Five

General Caine briefed reporters on March 31 on the operational scope: 11,000 or more targets struck in 30 days, including significant losses to its navy with more than 150 vessels damaged or destroyed, and the start of the first overland B-52 Stratofortress missions inside Iranian airspace.

CENTCOM reported that U.S. forces have struck more than 12,300 targets as of early April 2026. This figure includes approximately 1,300 additional targets struck in the days following the March 31 briefing.

Additional U.S. aircraft, including A-10s for counter-drone missions, continued flowing into theater. The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, with the 11th MEU en route.

Hegseth told reporters that in a single overnight period the joint force executed 200 dynamic strikes, missions where pilots receive updated target sets mid-flight based on real-time intelligence.

Cooper cited U.S. Space Force as a critical enabler, stating it has delivered “space superiority, which has been a critical enabler to this fight.” Cooper added: “Every branch of the military is achieving unprecedented success across air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.”

Hegseth assessed that operations are producing widespread desertions, key personnel shortages, and frustrations among senior Iranian leaders based on CENTCOM intelligence. An additional command bunker was destroyed, its leaders forced to flee, with no water, power, oxygen, or command and control capability remaining.

He briefed reporters that Iran’s defense industrial base is “nearly completely destroyed” with “negligible” reconstitution capacity.

Rubio addressed the four military objectives in a March 31 interview: “We’re going to destroy their air force — we already have done it; we’re going to destroy their navy — we’ve largely done that; we’re going to destroy their factories that make these missiles and these drones; and we are going to severely degrade their missile launchers.”

He said the operation is “on or ahead of schedule on each of those four objectives.” Rubio also cited Iran’s firing of two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia, adding they “could reach well into Europe” and that one failed and one was shot down.

Assessment:The progression from 7,800 or more targets at Alert 37 on March 19 to 12,300 as of April 2 represents approximately 4,500 additional targets in 14 days, an acceleration in strike tempo from the pace reported at the March 31 briefing.

The overland B-52 missions signal that Iranian integrated air defense has degraded sufficiently to allow slower, less survivable aircraft to operate over Iranian territory, expanding munitions capacity per sortie.

The 200 dynamic strikes executed in a single overnight period indicate an intelligence-cueing loop fast enough to service mobile targets as they relocate.

Iranian Defense Capacity After Five Weeks of Strikes

CENTCOM published a target category list on April 1 identifying 14 categories struck during Operation Epic Fury:

• Command and control centers

• IRGC headquarters buildings

• IRGC intelligence sites

• Integrated air defense systems

• Ballistic missile sites

• Iranian navy ships and submarines

• Iranian air defense systems

• Anti-ship missile sites

• Military communication capabilities

• Ballistic missile and drone manufacturing

• Weapons production and storage bunkers

• Surface-to-air missile facilities

• Military support infrastructure

Iran’s conventional navy is not sailing, its aircraft are not flying, and its air defense and missile defense systems have been “largely destroyed,” according to Cooper.

Hegseth reported the defense industrial base is “nearly completely destroyed” with “negligible” reconstitution capacity. Caine reported that the first overland B-52 missions are now operating inside Iranian airspace.

Iran’s missile and drone output has fallen to the lowest level since operations began, according to Hegseth. However, Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi stated via IRNA on April 2 that Iranian forces remain “prepared with their fingers on the trigger.”

The gap between U.S. characterization of near-total degradation and Iran’s assertion of continued readiness has not been independently resolved due to the 99.9 percent internet blackout.

Assessment:The breadth of CENTCOM’s 14 target categories indicates a campaign designed to dismantle Iran’s military infrastructure across all conventional domains simultaneously.

The deployment of B-52s over Iranian airspace, aircraft that cannot survive against functional integrated air defense, provides the most operationally measurable indicator that Iranian air defense has degraded below the threshold of effective engagement.

The central unknown remains missile and drone inventory depth: whether the decline in launches reflects depletion or deliberate conservation by Tehran’s new leadership cannot be determined from official U.S. sources alone.

Isfahan Ammunition Depot Struck; Iran Internet Blackout at 99.9 Percent

Hegseth announced that President Trump posted video of a U.S. bomber strike on an ammunition depot in Isfahan, central Iran. He said that the limited availability of battlefield footage is because “Iran has still shut off the internet to 99.9% of its population.”

The internet blackout, in effect since the early days of the conflict, continues to restrict independent reporting from inside Iran. The 99.9 percent figure represents the most specific official U.S. characterization of the shutdown’s scope to date.

Assessment:The internet blackout serves dual purposes for Tehran: it suppresses domestic dissent and prevents real-time damage documentation from reaching international audiences.

For outside analysts, the 99.9 percent figure means virtually all ground-truth verification of U.S. strike claims, casualty figures, and desertion reports depends on official U.S. and coalition sources rather than independent observation.

Any restoration of connectivity, even partial, would represent a measurable shift in Tehran’s information control posture and could signal either internal pressure or a negotiation concession.

Kuwait Strikes Draw Saudi Condemnation; UK Operations Expand

Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on March 30 condemning “in the strongest terms the heinous Iranian attacks targeting a camp belonging to the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, as well as a power and water desalination plant in the State of Kuwait, which resulted in injuries to a number of Kuwaiti Armed Forces personnel.”

The Saudi MFA said that Iran’s “blatant conduct toward the countries of the region confirm the continuation of an unjustifiable hostile approach” and added the attacks “risk further escalation in the region.”

The UK Ministry of Defence reported on March 30 that RAF Regiment gunners operating in a high-threat area downed multiple Iranian drones overnight.

UK Typhoons, F-35 jets, and Wildcat helicopters continued defensive missions over Cyprus, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Defense Secretary John Healey traveled to the Middle East for engagements with Gulf partners.

UK pilots and aircrew have now exceeded 1,200 flying hours during operations since the conflict began, according to the March 30 MoD update.

In a separate update on April 2, the MoD stated that RAF Regiment gunners operating in a high-threat area downed multiple Iranian drones overnight and that UK Typhoons, F-35 jets, and Wildcat helicopters continued defensive missions across the region.

Maritime Threat and Energy Disruption: JMIC, UN Resolution, UK Hormuz Planning

The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) assessed the overall maritime risk level across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman as CRITICAL in Update 027, dated April 2.

JMIC cited 27 maritime attacks, incidents, or suspicious activity since March 1, with zero vessel attacks in the preceding 48 hours.

Current observed Strait of Hormuz vessel traffic in the preceding 24 hours was 12 vessels against a historical baseline of approximately 138 per day, a reduction of more than 91 percent.

Maritime risk assessments continued to reflect severely reduced traffic, with some monitoring data showing daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz at single-digit levels against the pre-conflict baseline.

According to JMIC, more than 25 maritime incidents involving commercial vessels and offshore infrastructure had occurred across the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman since February 28.

The incidents involved a wide range of vessel types and flag states with no consistent pattern of Western ownership linkage, indicating a campaign aimed at broad maritime disruption rather than selective targeting.

On March 26, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi announced that vessels from China, Russia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Thailand would be permitted to transit the strait, creating a selective access system that excludes Western-flagged shipping.

Bahrain, supported by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Jordan, proposed a draft United Nations Security Council Resolution on the Strait of Hormuz on April 2, according to the UAE Mission to the United Nations and Bahrain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The draft resolution affirms that the Strait of Hormuz is open for all transit passage and that no state has the right to close or control it.

It authorizes states to take exclusively defensive measures to secure transit passage, requires countries using the authorization to notify and report to the UN, and creates a monitoring mechanism with monthly reporting by the UN Secretary-General.

The UK Ministry of Defence stated on April 2 that the UK’s Permanent Joint Headquarters will convene a meeting of military planners next week to discuss options to make the Strait of Hormuz accessible and safe for navigation.

This announcement came three days after Hegseth directly cited the Royal Navy in his March 31 burden-sharing challenge.

Ground Forces and Al-Qaeda Questions

Hegseth addressed public concern about ground forces, telling reporters: “Our adversary right now thinks there are 15 different ways we could come at them with boots on the ground. And guess what? There are.”

He said that no option has been foreclosed but cited President Trump’s internalization of lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan.

When asked whether the U.S. is targeting al-Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel, believed to be sheltering in Iran, Hegseth declined to identify a specific target. He said that “al-Qaeda remains our enemy” and “there are a lot of people on our target list in Iran, and if they were to be harboring al-Qaeda, they would certainly fit that list.”

War Powers Resolution: 60-Day Statutory Clock Expires Around April 28–29, 2026

The Trump administration filed a War Powers Resolution notification with Congress on March 2, four days after operations began on February 28.

The notification cited authority “pursuant to his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to conduct United States foreign relations,” according to Lawfare, which reviewed the notification text entered into the Congressional Record at Senate pages S736-S737.

No existing Authorization for Use of Military Force was cited. Lawfare reported that “the president is relying on his own authority under Article II of the Constitution to act against Iran, not any statutory enactment like the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.”

Both chambers voted on measures invoking the War Powers Resolution in the days following the notification. The Senate voted 47 to 53 on March 4 on a motion to discharge S.J.Res.104 from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Record Vote Number 46).

The only Republican vote in favor came from Sen. Rand Paul; the only Democratic vote against came from Sen. John Fetterman. The House rejected H.Con.Res.38, which directed the President to remove forces from Iran, by 212 votes to 219 on March 5 (Roll Call No. 85).

Neither vote granted authorization for continued operations. The rejection of both resolutions removed a binding congressional restriction but provided no statutory legal authority for the campaign.

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 limits military engagement to 60 days without explicit congressional authorization, followed by a mandatory 30-day withdrawal period.

From the February 28 start date, the 60-day statutory deadline falls on April 29, 2026. Trump told reporters in his April 1 address that strikes will continue “extremely hard” for two to three weeks, a timeline ending between April 15 and April 22, before the April 29 deadline.

The administration has not addressed publicly how it would characterize operations continuing past April 29 if no congressional authorization is enacted.

Assessment:The administration’s exclusive reliance on Article II authority, combined with congressional rejection of both restrictive resolutions, places the operation in a legal posture where no binding restriction exists but no statutory authorization has been granted.

Presidents of both parties have cited commander-in-chief powers or congressional acquiescence to continue operations past the 60-day limit; Congress has not successfully enforced the withdrawal requirement in any prior instance.

The April 29 deadline falls after Trump’s stated two-to-three-week strike timeline from April 1, but the absence of a formal end date leaves the legal question open if operations extend beyond that date.

What to Watch

• April 6 power grid deadline (8 p.m. ET): Trump posted on March 26 a 10-day pause on energy plant strikes expiring April 6. His April 1 address separately conditioned power grid strikes on the absence of a deal. Whether the administration acts or extends on April 6 is the next definitive decision point.

• Iranian leadership response to reported ceasefire overtures: Monitor for any public statements from Mojtaba Khamenei or Iranian Foreign Ministry acknowledging direct contact, which would contrast with prior denials of negotiations.

• War Powers 60-day deadline, April 29: No AUMF was cited and no congressional authorization was granted. Monitor for any new AUMF introduction, administration statements on legal authority, or congressional action ahead of April 29.

• Iranian response to April 2 Truth Social posts: Trump posted bridge destruction video and a direct deal ultimatum on April 2. Monitor Iranian Foreign Ministry and state media for a formal response.

• Iranian missile and drone output: The War Department cited the lowest fire day on record at the March 31 briefing. A sustained decline toward zero would indicate depletion rather than conservation. Monitor CENTCOM updates.

• Negotiation signals from Tehran: U.S. officials described talks as gaining strength through Witkoff, Kushner, Vance, and Rubio. Monitor for Iranian official statements acknowledging direct contact, which would contradict Tehran’s public denial of negotiations.

• Strait of Hormuz transit volume: Monitor AIS data via MarineTraffic and VesselFinder against the 21-transit baseline through March 19.

• Allied naval deployments: Hegseth directly cited the Royal Navy in the March 31 briefing. Monitor UK MoD and allied defense ministry statements for force commitments.

• Al-Qaeda targeting indicators: Hegseth declined to confirm or deny targeting of Saif al-Adel in the March 31 briefing. Monitor for strikes on non-military targets or statements referencing counterterrorism objectives.