FSR 1923 and the Intelligence Functions (2 NOV 1923)

Official Statements

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “On Nov. 2, 1923, Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, the acting Army chief of staff, issued the Field Service Regulations (FSR). The manual represented a milestone in formalizing the Army’s operational doctrine following the nation’s participation in World War I. Among its updates, the FSR presented a more systematic approach to military intelligence, establishing a practical and proactive process for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information regarding the enemy. Since 1905, the U.S. Army had used FSRs to prescribe command and tactical principles to be used across all combat arms.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “During World War I, the 1914 edition had been amended eleven times, resulting in a cobbled-together doctrine. To replace this patchwork regulation, General Hines issued the 1923 FSR to fully incorporate the lessons of the World War. The regulation was “published for the information and government of the Army of the United States in the theater of operations and as the basis of instruction of the combined arms for war service.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “The FSR was, Hines stated, “drafted from the viewpoint of a war against an opponent organized for war on modern principles and equipped with all the means of modern warfare.” Consequently, the new doctrine elevated the importance of the intelligence function within the combined arms team. The FSR defined military information as “essential to the efficient preparation and execution of strategical and tactical plans” and stated this information constituted “a vital element in the commander’s estimate of the situation and decision.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Although that definition could fit all types of input to a commander, the new regulation specifically used it to denote information on terrain and “the enemy’s military forces, his resources in manpower and matériel, his war aims and interests, and political, economic, and other data bearing on his ability to wage war.” At the outbreak of hostilities, the War Department’s General Staff would furnish field commanders with baseline intelligence on the terrain and enemy in the active theater of war.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Within the theater of operations, the FSR charged each unit “with the execution of the necessary measures for the collection of military information within its own zone of operation.” One new procedure was “a plan of intelligence research,” which systematically planned reconnaissance around the commander’s critical information needs. The range of sources expanded beyond traditional human assets to incorporate technologies developed during the World War. The regulations codified a technical collection network, including aerial observation and photography, radio intercepts, direction-finding (goniometry), and sound and flash ranging.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Once collected, the intelligence division on the general staff of larger units evaluated, collated, and analyzed the information. At the same time, the intelligence agencies of brigades, regiments, and battalions would perform the same function. The FSR directed information be evaluated “in the light of other reports received, the reliability of the source, and other known factors of the situation.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Somewhat optimistically, the new regulations stated this analysis would lead “to a more or less complete reconstruction of the enemy’s situation and activities and frequently furnishes the best indication of [the enemy’s] intentions.” After laying out various ways of sharing the information, the regulation noted delay in transmission decreased its value and, therefore, stressed the need to frequently and promptly transmit “incomplete items of information without waiting for more definite developments.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Finally, the regulations ensured the integration of intelligence personnel and products into tactical operations. Specialized intelligence personnel accompanied field patrols and manned observation posts to gather intelligence and coordinate reconnaissance. Paragraph 1 of the field orders was “devoted exclusively to information [of the enemy],” providing details “necessary for subordinates to know to enable them to perform their assigned tasks.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Until the eve of World War II, the 1923 FSR provided the doctrinal foundation for the U.S. Army. For the intelligence function, it marked the transition from traditional scouting to more technical collection. Moreover, it required intelligence officers to be more than just passive recipients of field reports; instead, they were expected to serve as active managers of analytical collection.”

• U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, November 13: “Article by Michael E. Bigelow, INSCOM Command Historian. New issues of This Week in MI History are published each week. To report story errors, ask questions, request previous articles, or be added to our distribution list, please contact: TR-ICoE-Command-Historian@army.mil.”